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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this project is to analyze the Japanese Foreign Policy as it has been 
presented after Japan’s defeat after the Second World War, having Neorealism as the theoretical 
framework. In this sense, the hypothesis presented throughout this work suggests that countries 
like Japan, even when presented at the international arena as peace loving nations, eventually 
arm themselves to be able to overcome potential threats. In this regard, for this principle belongs 
to a Neorealist thinking, the first step taken has been to elaborate more on the nature of this 
theory with the purpose of linking some theoretical concepts to the specific case of Japan. 
Furthermore, in order to prove correct the aforementioned hypothesis to the case of Japan, three 
axes have been taken in terms of foreign policy: the United States of America, the People’s 
Republic of China, and both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. The reason of choosing these four states is to provide a broader vision on alliances and 
threats, considering always that Japan has left the safe zone, it wanted to remain at. 
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RESUMEN 
 
El propósito principal de este proyecto es analizar la política exterior japonesa como se ha 
presentado después de la derrota de Japón en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, teniendo al 
Neorealismo como marco teórico. En este sentido, la hipótesis presentada a lo largo de este 
trabajo sugiere que países como Japón, aún cuando se presentan frente la arena internacional 
como estados pacíficos, eventualmente ven la necesidad de armarse para poder enfrentar 
potenciales amenazas. Por esto, dado que este principio pertenece a un razonamiento 
neorrealista, el primer paso es profundizar en la naturaleza de esta teoría, con el propósito de 
relacionar varios conceptos teóricos al caso específico de Japón. Adicionalmente, con el fin de 
probar la anteriormente mencionada hipótesis aplicada al caso de Japón, tres ejes han sido 
tomados, en términos de política exterior: los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, la República 
Popular de China, y ambas la República de Corea y la República Popular Democrática de Corea. 
La razón por la cual estos cuatro estados han sido escogidos es la de proveer una visión más 
amplia de las alianzas y amenazas que este país enfrenta, considerando siempre que Japón ha 
salido de la zona segura en la que ha buscado permanecer siempre. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the international system, states present themselves as actors that interact between 
each other; nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean they want to create an atmosphere of 
cooperation. In this context, defense and national security have been ever-present components of 
politics since the emergence of the modern nation-state.
1
 It is a fact that even when states defend 
a liberalist model, applied for their economy, externally they policies seem more properly 
explained through neorealism. As it can be exacted from the definition provided in the first part 
of this work, self-interest is in great part what motivates states to exercise their foreign policy; 
however, this does not mean that they are not willing to create alliances. The difference between 
creating them, also described as coordination, towards cooperation –which implies states need to 
give up some of the possible best outcome- needs to be well understood, in order to realize what 
actually happens in the international arena. At an anarchic international system, states are 
focused, above all, on their survival; though ironically, great powers have repeatedly formed 
alliances and initiated all-out wars that put the very survival of their nations at stake when they 
feel threatened by another state.
2
 The end of the rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the 
United States created a new order in which states are not paranoiac about capitalism/communism 
in the same way as before, but dynamics are pretty much the same: when a state feels threatened 
by one or many states, its government starts thinking in terms strengthening defense and national 
security. Once said this, the following question needs to be considered: Do states ever feel 
completely safe and out of the scope of any threaten? Even when the international system has 
tried to create the best platform possible for states to cooperate, this doesn’t meet it is efficient. 
The existence of all kinds of international organizations and the participations of such a large 
number of states cannot guarantee that states have reached the point where cooperation is 
stronger than pursuing their own interests, which is what most states – at least the most powerful 
ones- do even within those international organizations. National interest evolves, consequently, 
state’s foreign policy keeps reinventing itself and, in the aim or pursuing and exercising them 
                                                          
1
 Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindo, and Sadafumi Kawato. The Government and Politics of Japan. University of 
Tokyo Press, 1994, p 101. 
2
 Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindo, and Sadafumi Kawato. The Government and Politics of Japan. University of 
Tokyo Press, 1994, p 101. 
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respectively, there will always be threats for countries to fear about and prepare themselves to 
defend, or even attack. 
Japan is a suitable example of how states are constantly developing ways of protecting 
themselves from actual or even possible threats, and furthermore, it also serves as a good 
example of how states always find the way of developing their defense system, even they have 
renounce to the right to directly do so.  
2. WHAT SHAPES JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY? 
 Nowadays, it becomes evident that Japan is one of the most peace-loving nations in the 
world; however, this is not only due to the lessons learned after the Second World War,  if the 
fact that many states have started or actively participated in a war again –even after experiencing 
the devastating effects of it- is taken into account. Actually, what differentiates Japan from states 
of the nature aforementioned is that it absolutely fears being exposed to any kind of threats that 
targets its integrity. If stay under the logic on which Neorealism is based, it becomes easy to 
suggest that the main reason states feel unsafe is because of the actions, or attitudes, other states 
may have towards them; in this regard, geographical proximity plays a key role. Although the 
probabilities for territorial disputes to be originators of a massive war are lower than they were in 
before the Cold War –meaning nowadays it is more common for inter-state conflicts to develop-, 
they remain a factor that can trigger a conflict over borders, disputed territories, resource 
management or any reason that countries with geographical proximity may consider relevant; 
furthermore, independently of the frequency, these type of conflicts prove to be the hardest to 
solve, and the most likely to create a regional threat.
3
 In this sense, it is important to clarify that 
Japan has no intention of focusing its foreign policy on aggression to any of the states 
surrounding it; not only because they have renounced their right to as explained through their 
Constitution, but also because of the fear that arises from the very fact of belonging to such an 
hostile region. In other words, it would not be necessary for Japan to be one of the parties 
responsible of starting a conflict for it to be directly affected, and that is what has precisely 
                                                          
3
 Within the most long-lasting conflicts we have territorial disputes. Israel and Palestine stands as an accurate 
example of how setting borders and designating territory can serve as obstacles for reaching peace. In the same way, 
the conflict between Israel and Palestine has involved the rest of neighboring countries, making it evolve to Israeli – 
Arab conflict; in which countries like Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt have played a relevant role.  Conflicts like 
the Indian – Pakistani, or Sudanese – South Sudanese, also lie on the same art of territorial dispute. 
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helped the emergence of two reactions at this country, that at the same time complement each 
other: paranoia for other countries’ actions and the necessity to assure their security by other 
terms.   
3. NEOREALISM: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Neorealism has been a much criticized theory; however, many authors have come to 
accept that it does not fail in explaining the interaction of states within the international system in 
a more accurate way than many other theories; or at least, than the counter position expressed 
through Neoliberalism. In this aspect, Kenneth Waltz and his work have played a key role in 
developing a theoretical framework that allows Neorealism to present itself as a theory, rather 
than only as a hypothesis. Before applying those concepts presented by this theory on the 
specific case of Japan, it is important to develop some of them and explain their individual 
importance in explaining the behavior and interaction between states in the international system. 
Some concepts that are cornerstones of realism, and therefore serve as the axes, around which 
Neorealism develops, are anarchy, self-help, and power balancing.
4
 In the aim of providing a 
better conceptual framework, the three of those concepts will be further explained. 
3.1. Anarchy  
Anarchy remains a main characteristic of the international system within the frame of 
Neorealism; explaining that there is a big difference between the ordering principles of the 
national political structure, and the international political structure. International systems are 
decentralized and anarchic, while domestic political structures have governmental institution and 
offices as their concrete counterparts.
5
 The first term of a structural definition states the principle 
by which the system is ordered. Structure is an organizational concept. The prominent 
characteristic  of international  politics,  however,  seems  to  be  the  lack  of  order  and  of 
organization:
6
 
                                                          
4
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.1.  
5
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.32. 
6
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.32. 
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“International politics,  in  contrast,  has  been  called  "politics  in  the  absence  of 
government." International organizations do exist, and in ever-growing numbers.  
Supranational agents  able  to  act  effectively,  however,  either  themselves  acquire  
some  of the attributes and capabilities of states, as  did the medieval papacy in the era of 
Innocent III, or they soon reveal their inability to act in important ways except with the 
support,  or at least the  acquiescence,  of the principal states  concerned with the matters 
at hand. Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed 
from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. 
Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability. In the absence of 
agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super and subordination fail to 
develop.”7  
3.2 Self -Help 
“States are in anarchy, principle of action is self-help.”8 States cannot trust each other; 
therefore, they have their own defense as a major priority. They cannot trust some other state on 
providing them for all of their security; for example, if State “A” puts its security in the hands of 
State “B”, there will be a point where State’s A self- interests will be more urgent to treat than 
those of State’s B, or they could even be contrary. Eventually, every state ends up taking care of 
its own security; in this regard, Japan will serve as an excellent example further on. 
3.3 Balancing of Power 
When it comes to analyze the concept of Balance of Power, there is no explanation more 
accurate than the one provided by Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics. It was 
already mentioned that the international system is anarchic; however, the theory of the balance of 
power explains how states interact within it. First of all, it is important to consider that “states are 
unitary actors who seek their own preservation (at a minimum) or who drive for universal 
domination (at a maximum).”9 For any of both purposes, balance of power is necessary; States 
are more likely to survive and not be parties of any major conflict if they have the same amount 
                                                          
7
 Kenneth N. Waltz. Anarchy and its Consequences. p 32. 
8
 Sagan, S. D. and K. N. Waltz (1995). The spread of nuclear weapons : a debate. New York, W.W. Norton. p 1. 
9
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley), 1979, p 118 
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of power that its neighbours. If they are less powerful, other states will perceive them as weak; 
while if they are more powerful, other states will consider it a threaten and will get prepared for 
deterrence or defense in case they are needed. In this sense, Waltz recognizes two ways in which 
states can increase their capabilities: first refers to internal efforts, such as increasing economic 
capability, increase military size, or develop better military strategies; second refers to external 
efforts, by building alliances.
10
 Additionally, Waltz affirms that: “Balance-of-power politics 
prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it 
be populated by units wishing to survive.”11 
4. JAPAN SEEN FROM A NEOREALST PERSPECTIVE 
 
It is a fact that some elements keep changing and evolving at the international system; 
however, this does not really change itself as a whole. There are big changes, as Waltz says, in 
the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting; which strongly affect the way 
states interact, influence or even affect others. 
12
 Not diminishing the importance of the first two 
elements mentioned, the way countries exercise their foreign policy is strongly shaped by the 
way war fighting evolves throughout time, for it is strongly related to power exercise, and as a 
consequence, national security and interests. In this regard, Japan plays an indisputably 
important role in an era that has been the scenario of the most drastic changes within 
international security measures. In relation, Waltz expresses: 
“In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was 
the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-
help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own 
and possibly for others´ security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic 
structure of the international political system.”13 
                                                          
10
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley), 1979, Pg 118 
11
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley), 1979, Pg 121 
12
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.1 
13
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.1 
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Having the incursion of nuclear weaponry considered as one of the most significant 
alterations of the international system, it becomes necessary to discuss what are some of the 
consequences that its use brought to the way countries interact. First of all, it is in place to 
mention that the measure in which countries feel safe in relation to their similar others escalated 
to another level after the Second World War. It is a reality nowadays that states feel safer under 
the possession of nuclear armament; furthermore, they see in that an effective way of setting 
limits to their enemies action. Evidence is abundant to prove that, indeed, having military 
arsenals that include nuclear weapons has helped states to create an atmosphere of stability that 
was not as clear before they started arming themselves in a nuclear way. Following this logic, it 
is important to mention that, although the United States remains the most powerful country in the 
system, when considering nuclear capabilities, this can be claimed to have a multi-polar nature. 
For this reason, competition presents a different facet between countries; these are not tangibly 
competing against each other to eliminate enemies, but rather they are plunged into a 
competition of increasing their nuclear arsenals, and consequently, their national security.  
“Competition in multi-polar systems is more complicated than competition in bipolar 
ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as 
numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are 
hard to make.”14  
It has been frequently claimed that the possession of nuclear arsenals have taken the 
international system to stand on the cliff to a disaster never seen before. But, as Waltz would say, 
it helps creating a balance of power, and “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but 
to maintain their positions in the system.”15 In this regard, it becomes easy to understand that the 
ultimate goal of states is not necessarily to make use of these weapons, but rather to put 
themselves at the same level of power of those countries that have acquire them first. States arm 
themselves when feel they are in a zone of threaten; mistrust and fear impulse most of their 
actions, and the necessity of feeling protected to confront those threats leads to them acquiring 
arms –not only or necessarily nuclear weapons-. Based on this, the case of Japan will be 
                                                          
14
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.1 
15
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol.25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 
p.126 
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analyzed, by, at the same time, studying its alliances, its approaches towards security, and its 
performance at the international scenario. 
Having said that, the vital importance of analyzing the case of Japan lies in four main 
premises: First, it is the only country that has experienced the devastating effects of being the 
target of a nuclear attack; second, has formally renounced its right to go to war; third, as a 
consequence, has put its security in other state’s hand, and fourth, has proven to be in the 
necessity to change the third one, and therefore affect the second one. As following, all four of 
these points will be developed. 
5. THE UNITED STATES: AN ALLY AND A SHIELD  
 
When the Second World War was over, the situation did not only change for the defeated 
nations, meaning Germany, Italy and Japan, but for the international order itself. Neorealism 
affirms that the nature of the international systems always remains the same; what does change is 
who is playing what role within it. There is always the presence of the most prominent powers in 
it, and after World War II it was the United States turn, for having been the main responsible of 
the victory of the Allies. This country, undoubtedly, drawing on its immense economic power, 
but most of all, its military leadership, established the political structure known as the Pax 
Americana among the capitalist democracies.
16
 Nevertheless, this was too exclusive to be 
considerate the reality of the whole globe. After this big scale war, for the fortune of human kind 
and nations, there has never been the presence of such a big broken out conflict, though, when 
talking about risk caused by rivalries, the Cold War has been the closest to create a similar 
catastrophe. And although the Cold War managed to polarize almost the whole globe, there were 
other conflicts going on that contribute to the evolution that the international order was 
presenting. With these precedents and with the Asian region not precisely being the most 
powerful one, Japan’s foreign policy lost its autonomy,-at the same time leaving behind the 
aggressive and expansionist character that predominated in its actions for so long- and it had no 
more choice that succumbing under the willing of the United States. 
                                                          
16
 Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindo, and Sadafumi Kawato. The Government and Politics of Japan. University of 
Tokyo Press, 1994, p 101. 
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In order to understand the turn that Japan´s foreign policy gave, it is necessary to mention 
Article 9 of its Constitution, also known as the Peace Constitution and redacted under American 
occupation, which states as follows: 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign tight of the nation and the threat to use of 
force as a means of settling international disputes. In order t accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”17 
History proves that the creation of this Constitution was the formal expression that 
accompanied the actual desire of Japan to never again put its people in the position of being the 
target of devastating attacks from countries like the United States, which determination of using 
nuclear bombs devastated the Japanese population. By letting the Americans being responsible 
of the reemergence of Japan and deciding the future that this nation would have as a new 
democracy, both countries started one of the most long-lasting security alliances in modern 
history. Alliances were the only option left for Japan to defend and protect itself, in a moment 
where it was not allowed to develop its own military force. Moreover, the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960, which establishes that 
both parties assumed an obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories 
under Japanese administration; it was understood, though, that Japan could not come to the 
defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces 
overseas.
18
 
Although authors from both the United States and Japan have looked to describe the 
relations between both countries as one very stable, this has not necessarily being the case. 
Security has undoubtedly shape this relation; this automatically implies that because both states 
feel their security is threatened, they form an alliance to diminish the risks. Nonetheless, this 
does not mean that they would stop pursuing their self-interest above all things.  
                                                          
17
 Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindo, and Sadafumi Kawato. The Government and Politics of Japan. University of 
Tokyo Press, 1994, p 102. 
18
 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden . Japan: A country Study. Washington DC, 1992. p 388 
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First of all, it is important to mention that the alliance between American and Japanese 
cannot be seen as an unbalanced one, where the United States results as the strong one. It is a 
fact that Japan was facing a terrible position after the Second World War was over, but, in the 
same way, it has to be acknowledged that it recovered from it as only few states have. In this 
context, it becomes evident that not only that the United States had to be in charge of Japan’s 
security after its own initiative of making Japan quit their arms, but quickly the Americans 
started seeing in Japan as their best, and powerful –not in terms of arms- ally in Asia. Japan’s 
economy started experiencing an outstanding growth, which gave it back his important role at 
the international level, just in other terms. This was something that the U.S could not afford to 
ignore. “Japan- United States relations improved enormously in the 1970s and 1980s, as the two 
societies and economies became increasingly intertwined. In 1990 their combined gross national 
product (GNP) totaled about one third of the world’s GNP.”19 It is not the purpose of this section 
to deeply describe the economic relations that both counties sustained, but rather to focus in the 
political and security relations that had to overcome ups and downs that their economic relations 
faced.  
As mentioned before, and as both the United States and Japan seemed to fully 
understand, the security alliance would always have priority over economic and other disputes. 
Therefore, even if Americans and Japanese had experiment some distancing in different points of 
history, they have also proven to stick together when security matters have merit it. The Soviet 
Union serves as a good axis to analyze this. There is no need to go into the rivalry between The 
United States and the Soviet Union in any depth, but it is necessary to mention that its presence 
in Europe and Asia was a threaten for both Japanese and American. 
“In the late 1980s, the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the growing 
preoccupation of Soviet leaders with massive internal political and economic difficulties 
forced the Japanese and United States governments to reassess their longstanding alliance 
against the Soviet threat”20 
 It is important to mention that not only the United States perceived socialist Soviet Union 
as a geographical enemy, but so did Japan following its new democratic tradition, especially 
                                                          
19
 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden . Japan: A country Study. Washington DC, 1992. p 384 
20
 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden . Japan: A country Study. Washington DC, 1992. p 385 
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when the Soviets started expanding their sphere of influences to East Asia, specifically Vietnam. 
In the same way, the Soviet Union perceived Japan and the United States as a threat to its 
purpose of expanding; therefore, it positioned forces against them in the Pacific. In relation to 
this, Japanese and Americans stressed that “until Moscow followed its moderation in Europe 
with major demobilization and reductions in its forces positioned against the United States and 
Japan in the Pacific, Washington and Tokyo needed to remain militarily prepared and vigilant.”21 
This, as aforementioned, was also an alert state towards Vietnam, and of course the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea); which could result as potentially disrupted forces.22 
Ironically, some United States officials noted that the alliance helped keep Japan’s potential 
military power in check and under the supervision of the United States.”23 The rapidity with 
which Japan’s economy was growing was, undeniably, a matter of concern for the United States, 
since they knew Japan had what was necessary to get away of American hands. Although Japan 
and the United States were just as affected of the leadership that the Soviet Union was acquiring 
in the region, the United States started to also feel threatened by the economic growth that Japan 
was experimenting. In spite of this, Japan kept considering the United States as the principal 
guardian of their external security; but it has to be taken into consideration that there has always 
been pressure exercised by the Japanese left-wing against military dependence on the United 
States, especially in regards to American military bases functioning in Japanese territory. In 
these terms, the alliance between both countries continued, but it was more evident than ever 
before it was maintained as a coordination of efforts and shared interest. Both states were aware 
of their strengthen, but so were they of the strengthen of the other one. Notwithstanding, things 
were about to change for both countries. 
 When the Soviet Union sunk, so did the idea built around Socialism. For this reason, as it 
has happened in every chapter of American history related to foreign policy, the United States 
was in the search of its new enemy. This, of course, affected the relation existent between 
Washington and Tokyo; as it is logical, if East Asia was not anymore number one in the list of 
critical regions for the U.S., Japan was immediately also left behind in some extent. “The 
political issues between the two countries were essentially security-related and derived from 
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efforts by the United States to induce Japan to contribute more to its won defense and to regional 
security.”24 The United States saw itself in the position to attend other issues in different regions; 
during the 1980s the American interest would be concentrated in the Middle East, for what it 
needed Japan to be more self-sufficient in the East Asian region. The United States found itself 
in the position, where it needed -and therefore requested- Japan to increase their military 
expenditure; and at the same time, Japan felt the necessity to look for protection independence, 
since the United State was absolutely still trying to defend its own interest, but somewhere else. 
For this reason, Japan –in spite of the clear constitutional obstacle and a pacifist general thinking 
and public opinion- decided to accelerate the buildup of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
25
 
 It is important to stress that Japan was –and still is- considered as the best ally the United 
States could have in the whole Asian region; however, the curse of events just highlighted the 
necessity for both countries to separately attend their foreign issues. Once again, Neorealism 
emphasizes that elites pursue their own interests, and that these interests are often defined in 
terms of keeping power.
26
 Having the United States precisely pursuing that, Japan had to develop 
what is known nowadays as a comprehensive security and defense strategy to safeguard peace; 
policy under which Japan sought to place its relations with the U.S on a new footing –one of 
close cooperation but on a more reciprocal and autonomous basis, and on a global scale.
27
 In this 
regard, Japan starts presenting itself as a rather peace-loving power to the world, and exercises 
and assures its security by creating goodwill. For Japan:  
“The answer lies in several responses: a demonstration of a more open home market (a 
willingness to take as well as give), greater real participation in multilateral institutions, a 
continued reassurance that Japan is not a military threat, and a large effort to participate 
in humanitarian activities around the world to demonstrate that Japan is a benevolent 
power.”28 
 It is hard to imagine a scenario where Japan has the intention to return to the militarism 
that characterized its foreign policy during the 1930s, but it is also hard to imagine any country 
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not falling the natural course of international relations and their dynamics that does not need to 
defend itself and that is willing to present itself as undefended, despite of being considered a 
power as Japan is. The Japanese have truly proved to be disciplined in the sense that they have 
not violated what is stipulated in the Constitution, in order to exercise their security matters. In 
relation to this, the best example is the deployment of Peacekeeping Operations, of course under 
the United Nations mandate, that count on a vast number of Japanese personnel. This step, taken 
in 1992, does not necessarily lead to eventual alteration of the constitution, since Japan is not 
attacking any country, but rather participating in different activities related to the re-
establishment of peace in the name of the international community. 
29
 If Japan maintains its role 
in the international arena as a nation that never fails to engage in humanitarian activities, and 
keeps providing contributions for natural disaster reliefs, public health and education work in 
developing countries, refugee work, and food and medical assistance to the victims of conflict 
through the world, as it has been doing until now; many would claim that Japan would not have 
the necessity to consider going to conventional militarism. However, this would definitely not be 
enough to prevent a possible crisis in the Korean Peninsula, situation that will be described in 
other section. 
 By Japan looking for some military independence, it did not stop believing that the 
United States was his best ally in the whole world. Therefore, the Japanese saw as a priority to 
keep defending its best interests in the American politics scenario, and managed to direct 
American efforts to Japanese efforts. As a consequence, at the end of the 1980s Japanese 
politicians where asking each other: “We have Carter and Reagan. Now who can buy Bush?”30 It 
is well known that politics in the United States obey to the intentions that a specific lobby, or 
more, may have; however, the great influence that the Japanese lobby exercised has widely been 
overshadowed by similar organizations, just to mention some, the Jewish and even the Arab 
ones. Facts like that: 
“Japan has been the largest spender on identifiable lobbying activity in Washington since 
1984. […] by 1988, Japanese entities were spending a conservatively estimated 310 
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million dollar a year, not including advertising, in shaping and guiding the overall 
American decision-making system. This spending has continued to escalate rapidly. ”31 
have been widely ignored; adding that most Americans believe their government is still in a 
position to shape Japan and its policies but that it simply has not found the right formula.
32
 The 
self-sufficiency that the United State was once expecting from Japan became something real, and 
the Japanese government became also really good at looking for their self-interest, and even 
sometimes turned to the Americans for a better accomplishment of them. But as said before, 
Japan is not the only country that uses lobbying to get concrete results, so, in this sense, it is 
important to specify what makes it different than the rest of lobbies: “Japan has become 
increasingly sophisticated in using its direct investments and American technological and 
financial dependencies on Japan to shape the U.S political climate.”33 This is the bargaining chip 
that even Israelis, who count on one of the most effective lobbies worldwide, do not have; for as 
much as Japan has benefited from economic close ties with the United States, so has this country 
from technological advances that Japan has developed faster than any other nation. In this regard, 
many could argue that there is not a necessary connection between economic relations and 
security and political matters; however, Neorealism allows us to see that alliances –as ephemeral, 
unstable, and selfish as they can be- just work as long as the parties maintain their self-interest 
covered. In fact, as Waltz would sustain: “In a self-help system, considerations of security 
subordinate economic gains to political interest.”34 For this reason, it does not matter if, in this 
case, Japan is using economic and technological measures to accomplish its political purposes 
because what the United States receives in both areas is considered to be critical. Looking at the 
following example will help understand better this reasoning: 
“The classic case was the Toshiba machine flap in 1987 and 1988. Toshiba beat what 
appeared to be a clear majority in the U.S. Congress that wanted to impose tough 
sanctions against it for the shipment of submarine propellers-making equipment to the 
Soviets. By using a combination of grass-roots politicking and Washington lobbying, 
Toshiba was able to escape with only minor damage. Whether it was wise to penalize 
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Toshiba or not it beside the point. Toshiba, backed by the rest of Japan’s influence 
network and coached by some of Washington’s top political experts, was able to identify 
companies, plant managers, suppliers, and other Americans who would suffer if Toshiba 
were penalized”35 
 As a conclusion, we can say that the relations between the United States and Japan have 
strongly evolved throughout the years, and –when looking from a Neorealist perspective- it is not 
necessarily an interaction that puts one of the parties in disadvantage; especially Japan as many 
would think. Although after the Second World War Japan could not afford to isolate from the 
United States, the evident relation of interdependence created during the 40s has been affected 
by many changes. Nowadays, we can still observe that security issues are a big priority for both 
states; nonetheless, they solve them in a more equitable base. It is important that states do not 
decide to do it so, as liberalism for example would sustain; on the other side, states want to avoid 
as much as possible to depend on some other state to accomplish their best interests. However, 
this does not mean that they do not interact with each other, in the case they where cooperation 
can lead them to accomplish their ultimate goal. And, if so, it is important to mention that any 
goal is valid, as well as any measure is valid, to accomplish the cooperation from the other part. 
As Waltz states:  
“One must wonder whether economic interdependence is more effect than cause. 
Internally, interdependence becomes so close that integration is the proper word to 
describe it. Interdependence becomes integration because internally the expectation that 
peace will prevail and order will be preserved is high. Externally, goods and capital flow 
freely where peace among countries appears to be reliably established. Interdependence, 
like integration, depends on other conditions. It is more a dependent than an independent 
variable. States, if they can afford to, shy away from becoming excessively dependent on 
goods and resources that may be denied them in crisis and wars. States take measures, 
such as Japan’s managed trade, to avoid excessive dependence on others.”36 
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Japan and the United States still have many strategic points, where both of them need the 
involvement of the other. A good example is the possibility of the Korean Peninsula to succumb 
to the possibility of a crisis, that would highly threaten Japan’s security; or, in the same way, a 
rapprochement from Americans and Chinese, or Russians, which would definitely preoccupy 
Japan. Under the administration of Barak Obama, it has been expressed several times the 
necessity from his country to come closer together with both nations, meaning that there is 
always the possibility for the United States to be opened for cooperation with Russia and China 
if that increases the chances for it to accomplish its objectives, even if that puts Japan in an 
uncomfortable situation. It is important to consider that it has happened before in the history of 
U.S – Japan relations that both countries have turned to a third country that puts the alliance in 
risk. However, that is the way countries interact in the international system, and self-interest will 
always prevail. Finally, there are many ways to explain why the United States, when being the 
most powerful country, has had trouble to maintain Japan’s policies under its control; first it 
must be considered that the traditional instruments that the U.S once used to cajole and prod 
Japan have declined in their effectives, while the Japan’s ability to inverse those action has 
increased exponentially.
37
 Second:  
“To manage the Americans, the Japanese have promoted the development of an 
impressive intellectual and political edifice in the United States. Although other nations 
have also played the influence game, Japan’s is the broadest, most sustained, and most 
richly endowed effort the Americans have witnessed.”38   
Third, and probably most importantly, the Japanese government has learned immensely 
important lessons after the Second World War was over about how to deal with the rest of the 
world without a military option, as the vast majority of countries do; therefore, it has realized 
that its relation to the United States can also be fruitful for them, as long as the U.S is conscious 
of how much it needs Japan on its side. 
6. JAPAN AND CHINA’S NEVER ENDING STRUGGLE  
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 Japan and China have always exercised influence on each other; even long before 
existing as the modern states we know nowadays. However, “the priority that policy toward 
China has commanded in Japanese foreign affairs has varied over time.”39 There are a very large 
number of aspects that define the nature of the relation between these states; nevertheless, for 
this paper, only those related to security will be taken into account.  
 First of all, it is important to consider that after the Second World War, China’s 
perception of Japan is mostly shaped after the Japanese’s close relation to the United States. 
Although China and Japan have more cultural proximity than Japan will ever have to the United 
States, in terms of ideology and political system Japan was expected to see China with rivalry, 
just as the United States would see any communist country. Nevertheless, proving Neorealism 
right once more, in what regards to regional stability, both China and Japan have successfully 
left their disparities aside and pursuit their common interest; taking into account that it has been 
within their best interest and capabilities to do so. A good example to support this idea is the 
drifting apart that the Soviet Union experienced with China, in spite of their ideological 
proximity, and the way China found the necessity to see an ally in Japan and do not allow the 
Soviets to predominate in the region. “The growth of Soviet military power in East Asia in the 
early 1980s prompted them [the Chinese] to consult with Japan more frequently on security 
issues and to pursue parallel foreign policies designed to check Soviet influence and promote 
regional stability.”40 Japan, as well as China, felt uncomfortable with Soviet presence in the 
Asian region, which historically has been a sphere of influence principally for the Chinese. But 
this fear only intensified when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, event that directly affected the 
Persian Gulf oils supply routes and affected both countries; which were experiencing vast 
industrialization and economic growth.
41
 Furthermore, the influence of the Soviet Union became 
a threat for Chinese and Japanese when it increased its military presence throughout the 
continent, especially in Vietnam.
42
   
“In response, Japan and China adopted strikingly complementary foreign policies, 
designed to isolate the Soviet Union and its allies politically and to promote regional 
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stability. In Southeast Asia, both countries provided strong diplomatic backing for the 
efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to bring about a 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Japan cut off all economic aid to Vietnam and 
provided substantial economic assistance to Thailand to help with resettling Indochinese 
refugees. China was a key supporter of Thailand and of the Cambodian resistance groups. 
In Southeast Asia, both nations backed the condemnation of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, and sought through 
diplomatic and economic means to bolster Pakistan. In Northeast Asia, Japan and China 
sought to moderate the behavior of their Korean partners – South Korea and North Korea, 
respectively- to reduce tensions. In 1983 both China and Japan strongly criticized the 
Soviet proposal to redeploy some of their European- based SS – 20 missiles to Asia.”43  
In this regard, if history would have stopped in the 1980s, it could be stated that Japan 
and China established close cooperation and coordination ties, and had the best interest on 
staying allies. However, it is important to analyze the real nature of the alliance between both 
countries. There is nothing that States fear more than having their integrity attacked, which 
implies that they would make anything possible to prevent this from happening. On a general 
basis –of course there are exceptions- states, just as human beings, have a memory that leads 
them to avoid repeating experiences from the past; in relation to this, it is important to mention 
that enough wars took place between China and Japan in the past. Additionally, the atmosphere 
of Southeast Asia at that moment could not lead to any better ending if both countries would not 
decide to jointly counteract the spread of the Soviets in the region. But once the common threat 
disappeared, mostly due to the reasons exposed before and to the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union, the interaction between Japan and China went back to normal and they both turned to 
their allies, which were not called so by default like in the case of both of these countries.  
“Japanese leaders – like West European and United States leaders- were careful not to 
isolate China, and continued trade and other relations generally consistent with the 
policies of other industrialized democracies. But they also followed the United States 
lead in limiting economic relations notably advantageous to China.”44   
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Notwithstanding, just as China is a state that Japan has to be alert of, is China the 
responsible of the United States feeling the same necessity. Before deepening on this relation, it 
is important to consider two facts: First, China and the United States have perceived each other 
as potential threats throughout history; ideologically speaking, both countries have considered 
each other as a reason of paranoia, and are globally considered the heads of two rival blocs. 
Second, despite how different the U.S is from China –not only domestically, but also 
internationally- both governments have proven to be aware of how strategically important is for 
them to form an alliance in relation to certain topics. This inevitably causes that the way the 
United States approaches to China does not always depends on or considers the interest of Japan 
as a priority. Some occasions in the past help supporting the fact that the United States cannot 
afford just having Japan as an ally in the region; therefore it has found itself in the necessity of 
coming closer to South Korea, many countries in the South East Asia region, and even China. 
Japan’s position to the United States’ action in this sense can be understood by the following 
example: 
“In July 1971, the Japanese government was surprised by Nixon’s dramatic 
announcement of his forthcoming visit to the People’s Republic of China. Many Japanese 
were chagrined by the failure of the United States to consult in advance with Japan before 
making such a fundamental change in foreign policy.”45 
Undoubtedly, this marks a point of inflexion in the relations between Tokyo and 
Washington, which until now where experiencing no major problems. However, what is relevant 
to this part of the paper is how the United States getting closer to China had an effect in making 
Japan get closer to China, too; by setting a precedent in which self-interest, balance of power and 
anarchy end up shaping a state’s behavior more than other factors.  
An aspect that is worth of mention is that Japan and China have, for several times in 
history, grown apart and then come closer together again; examples that support this are the 
Tiananmen Square incident in Beijing in 1989, as well as how the Chinese have managed the 
situation with Taiwan and Tibet, respectively. But it is also important to mention that, in spite of 
all the instability that these incidents may cause, states at the end find themselves creating 
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alliances that prove to be temporarily useful, and there is always the possibility on the table for 
them to end and begin again. This, show us that the international arena works under a dynamic of 
self-help, and that states will do anything they need to fulfill their interest; it does not matter if 
this are long or short-lasting.  
It is no within the goals of this paper to give a historical description of the relations 
between these two countries, but rather to explain how having so geographically close an state 
like China, has contributed to the decision Japan has taken of turning to a strengthening of its 
military situation.    
To describe the way Japan and China interact, it is necessary first to understand that the 
constant changes of position these two states have experienced are because they do not 
voluntarily want to cooperate with each other; but rather they have found each other in the 
position where they have to. The United States has played a crucial role in this, but even without 
its presence, Chinese and Japanese have extremely different postures in relation to their foreign 
policies. In the same way, they do not have the same interests always within the Asian region, 
which has definitely leaded to moments of big instability. A good example is the Korean War 
when: 
“A Chinese volunteer force prevented UN forces under the leadership of the United 
States from claiming victory in the Korean War, which could have resulted in the 
unification of the peninsula by South Korea. It also is probable that without the U.S. 
defense commitment, Taiwan would have been taken over by the PRC.
46
 
 In this context, Japan’s insecurity towards China –responsible of what many authors call 
the ‘remilitarization’ of Japan- relies on two main facts: the fear Japan has of China going 
against it, taking into account it is a more powerful country, and the immense growth China has 
been experiencing, as well as how this could affect within the region. 
Japan was a key contributor to the take off of China’s economic development; in fact: 
“toward the end of the 1970s, China expressed readiness to accept direct loans from the Japanese 
government on concessionary terms to finance various projects in key sectors of the Chinese 
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economy. This marked a fundamental change in relations between Japan and China.”47 The 
Japanese, who based their economy on liberal principles, and whose economic growth was so 
prosperous that they could afford providing development cooperation throughout the region, did 
not feel comfortable with China’s economy shooting up. Furthermore, the aid provided by the 
Japanese government did not only come in the form of loans, but also through the Official 
Development Agency, letting Japan extend their sphere of influence based on development. And 
even when this type of aid is directed to useful projects –and taking into account that 
development aid has served Japan very well as a bargaining chip with many other states- the 
following has become a subject of discussion in Japan: 
“In essence, it asserts that Japan should stop giving large amounts of ODA to China for 
three reasons: First, giving China economic assistance is tantamount to subsidizing the 
massive buildup of its military sector, which increasingly is becoming a threat to Japan’s 
security. Second, China gives assistance to many other developing countries, and there is 
no need to assist any country that can afford to assist others. Third, China does not 
appreciate Japan’s assistance.”48  
 All three reasons are issues the Japanese government is aware of; nevertheless, cutting off 
aid to China would definitely not put Japan in a better position. First of all, although many of the 
aid provided by Japan has been designated to military spend, this must not be misunderstood, in 
the sense that China would still be able to develop their military force without Japan’s aid. 
Additionally, it is no within the Japanese general behavior to deny assistance to any country; in 
this case, China evidently still needs to develop more, for it would not go according to Japanese 
foreign policy to cancel it in the case of China. If we go beyond this, we can see that there is 
evidently a mis-appreciation from China towards Japan’s financial and development assistance. 
And the fact that China does not approach to Japan in the same way it does to other allies puts 
Japan in a situation where it knows it haves to be prepared to any unexpected change of policy. 
Best example of how China keeps teasing Japan is the islands issue, where both claim them. In 
the case a conflict would break because of those islands, Japan is obviously less prepared than 
                                                          
47
 Yutaka Kawashima. Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First 
Century, Washington DC, 2003, p 98 
48
 Yutaka Kawashima. Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First 
Century, Washington DC, 2003, p 101-102 
 
25 
 
 
 
China to fight a territorial war. In this regard, China has abused Japan’s fear for even getting 
close to such a situation, and therefore, does not really sees Japan as much of menace, unless the 
United States would be strongly involved. Consequently, a Japanese change of policy, and the 
possible nuclearization of its defense system, would undoubtedly change China’s perception on 
Japan.  
7. THE FEAR OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
 
 In terms of geopolitics and security, the Korean Peninsula remains the most critical 
region for Japanese security. And although this is not a reality that only started to develop in 
recent times, but rather has been going on and changing for more than a thousand years; 
nowadays the threat that instability in this region presents has been a cause for Japanese 
paranoia. In this part of the essay, the options that Japan has to deal with the always existent 
possibility of a crisis in the Korean Peninsula will be analyzed, taking also into account the 
influence that other actors, such as the United States, exercise. For example: 
“During the cold war, all the major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China—were aware that the outbreak of another war in the Korean Peninsula could ignite 
a third world war; therefore, they dealt with the peninsula cautiously. In a sense, the cold 
war ensured the status quo. South and North Korea competed against each other to 
improve their relative standing in the international community, with the full backing of 
their respective allies.”49 
 
 As mentioned before, both Koreas and Japan have had ongoing relations for long ago; in 
fact, after Japan occupied the Peninsula it was a whole challenge for its politicians to try to 
establish diplomatic relations with both Koreas, when they could always play the card of past 
occupation. However, nowadays, we can see that North Korea has remained more of an issue to 
Japan than South Korea, for the last mentioned and Japan have one threat to deal with in 
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common, being this, precisely, North Korea and its advanced military resources. Nevertheless, 
North Korea’s willingness to continue with its military and nuclear program is not the only 
obstacle that make relations with Japan difficult to come to normality; for this reason, other 
factors will be analyzed first, in the aim of creating a broader scenario.  
“North Korea’s stunning admission in 2002 of its past abduction of many innocent 
Japanese and its clandestine development of nuclear weapons reminded the Japanese 
people of the stark reality that the divided Korean Peninsula remains a serious challenge 
to the security of Japan.”50 
 After the Second World War was over, and as stated throughout this paper, Japan had a 
major change in its foreign policy and decided that pursuing friendly and stable relations with all 
countries was in its best interest. Though, it is also important to remember that even if states 
establish relations between each other, this does not mean they would always prefer to defend 
their own interests, even if that affects or deteriorates the relation they have with determinate 
country. In the case of Japan, we can see that some issues have remained unresolved in relation 
to its neighbours; North Korea and the abduction of Japanese citizens is one of the best 
examples. And although it remains a priority for Japan to contribute and assure the stability in 
the Korean Peninsula, it has encountered many difficulties in coming to better terms with North 
Korea because of this matter. Taking into account that “in part because of North Korea’s refusal 
to address squarely the issue of its abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, no 
progress was achieved throughout the 1990s,”51 it has also delayed the possible achievement of 
instability in the Peninsula. And starting from the point that Japan fears, probably more than any 
other state, a possible breakout of war in the Peninsula, it needs to be explained why it has not 
being able to leave aside the abduction issue to fully normalize its relations with the DPRK. 
 As Yutaka Kawashima, former vice president of Foreign Affairs of Japan, states, the 
abduction issue has several unique features:  
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“First, the abduction of innocent foreign nationals by a state agent—and the possible 
killing of some of them—could be regarded as casus belli under traditional international 
law. Because it could lead to war, and because the perpetrating state is likely to be 
severely condemned by the international community, such crimes have seldom been 
committed.”52 
 In this regard, if it would not be for the fact that military retaliation obviously was out of 
the question for Japan, abduction of citizens would make any state – in possibilities to- take 
military actions in response to such a crime. Such actions would possibly start a crisis in the 
Korean Peninsula –which does not seem an ideal scenario for Japan of nowadays- but that is 
probably what any state would react like in a similar situation. In this context, Japan has been in 
the necessity to always look for options to engage North Korea “in such a way that it would 
realize that resolving the abduction issue was in its own interest.”53 It is important to mention 
that the United States and South Korea have also found itself in the same position of finding a 
bargaining chip they can use to make North Korea realize it needed to quit being a threat to the 
region, and even the world. One initiative that serves as an example to show the recurrent efforts 
of Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans is the following: 
“In the event, in the mid-1990s, KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization) was founded jointly by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan 
to implement the light-water project, and it became an important forum for engaging 
North Korea. The ROK agreed to bear roughly three-quarters of the construction costs of 
the reactor, while Japan expressed its readiness to contribute roughly U.S.$1 billion. 
Initially it was argued that by the time the project was completed, the peninsula would be 
united, and therefore the project would not entail a loss of money for the ROK. It is not 
clear whether that argument had any impact on the ROK’s decision-making.”54 
But despite of this efforts, North Korea did not fixed in its totally the abduction issue –as 
Japan it expected, neither did it stop its nuclear program as the United States, Japan, South Korea 
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and the rest of the world it wanted. In this point it is necessary to examine what would actually 
mean for North Korea to possess a nuclear arsenal? A report carried out by the Department of 
Defense of the United States correctly developed an hypothesis based on North Korea’s army 
empowering itself with Weapons of Mass Destruction being the perfect instigator for another 
war in the Peninsula, which could be even more disastrous that the Korean War. Additionally, 
this report suggested that “the possession of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea could 
disrupt the precarious balance of power in the peninsula.”55 It has been mentioned before at this 
paper the importance of balance of power, for there to put states at the same level of power and, 
consequently, reduce the risk for a conflict to break out; therefore, for North Korea to have 
Weapons of Mass Destruction also meant for it to create an unbalance of power in relation to 
South Korea, and of course Japan, that only counts with the right to defend itself in case other 
state would attack its territory. However, there is no way to exercise defense in response to a 
Nuclear attack, unless it is also based on the use of nuclear weapon, creating a conflict of an 
scale the international community has never experienced before in history. This is why Japan, as 
much as possible, has avoided coming to any kind of disagreement with North Korea that could 
lead to an escalation of already existent tensions; nonetheless, this has not been the same attitude 
North Korea has been having towards Japan. Indeed, “in 1998 North Korea conducted a test 
launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan, igniting serious alarm among the Japanese.”56 This 
action mostly lead to three important reactions from the Japanese: first, they found themselves in 
the necessity of enforcing its alliance to the Americans and the South Koreans more than ever 
before; second, they realized the necessity of finding a way to -at least temporarily- control the 
North Koreans; and third, they started considering developing their own defense security system, 
in case North Korea would actually attack them.  
In relation to the first one, there have always been two scenarios possible. For the first 
one, although every time less and less viable, if North Korea decides to give up its development 
of Weapons of Mass destruction and eventually to get rid of the arsenal they already have 
developed and ready to be used; then Japan, in alliance with the United States and South Korea 
would pursue more than ever before to improve their respective relations to the DPRK. This 
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would, logically, have different implications for each of the 3 allies, but in general terms we 
could say that -in the best case scenario- it would benefit everyone with instability. For the 
second scenario, which is more realistic and is actually part of what has been happening until 
now, North Korea will persist along its provocative path, and Japan, the U.S. and South Korea 
would have to take steps to ensure their security and contain the threat.
57
 Referring to the alliance 
created between these three states, the report aforementioned sustained the following: 
“In fact, the most commendable achievement with regard to the security of the peninsula 
in the 1990s was the close consultation and cooperation among the three countries in 
grappling with the newly emerging challenges of WMD development by North Korea. 
Before that, there had been no such endeavor among the three, partly because the security 
situation was more predictable during the cold war and because the political climate in 
both Japan and the ROK was not ripe for such a close tripartite working relationship.”58 
In relation to the second topic to be treated, which makes allusion to Japan having to 
temporarily find the way to control North Korea’s action, it is necessary to elaborate on the 
assistance provided by Japan. It is not a secret that North Korean people have been affronting a 
food crisis for long enough to have hundreds of thousands to die of starvation; as it is not a secret 
that the dynastic-authoritarian government has had as a priority the military spend over any other 
kind of necessities the population may have. In this context, Japan has provided the North 
Korean Government with uncountable assistance, but this has been perceived in many different 
ways. First, there has always been the fear present that giving financial assistance to North 
Korea’s government had the risk of it spending it for its military, in which case Japan would be 
subsidizing those efforts that, at the end, threaten it and the whole region. On the other side, 
Japan managed to notice that: 
 “food assistance could serve a strategic interest as well, because it would reduce the 
possibility of a major upheaval in the North triggered by the deteriorating food supply 
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and of ensuing chaos in the peninsula. It would be safer to avoid such an event if at all 
possible.”59 
 Going even deeper than that, Japan realized that providing assistance to North Korea 
would not only increase the possibilities for its government to be willing to treat the abduction 
issue, but; furthermore, it would for the first time give the DPRK a reason for them to have 
something to lose if they keep provoking Japan. This, but no means, restores the balance of 
power between both of them, but temporarily creates a relation where both benefit if they stay in 
good terms. In this point, and before treating the third topic, it is important to mention what 
would be the possible scenarios under which North Korea would consider necessary to directly 
attack Japan. As Kawashima states: “Because of the two nations’ history, and geographical 
proximity, developments on the Korean Peninsula always touch a raw nerve in Japan. In that, the 
Korean issue is unique in Japanese foreign policy.”60 This is important because, before analyzing 
the direct threats to Japan, it must be bear in mind that: 
“There is a possibility that North Korea is trying to reach out in some bizarre way to the 
rest of the world, notably to the United States for a guarantee of survival and to Japan for 
massive economic assistance. Once again, the stakes for South Korea, the United States, 
and Japan in maintaining their solidarity are very high.”61 
But even for the same reason, Japan could be the perfect target for North Korea to attack 
in case t wants to go against the United States, and even against the West; in the sense Japan is 
much more perceived as western. However, the most logical explanation of why would North 
Korea not stop provoking Japan –and South Korea in the same nature- is that it counts on the 
military force to make a country that cannot use force feel intimidated, and even more after the 
experiences Japan has already gone through during the Second World War. There is no more 
realist behavior than menacing a neighboring country with the purpose of assuring a state’s 
survival and that’s exactly what the North Koreans have chosen as the main component of their 
foreign policy towards Japan, a state that is key in providing North Korea with food and 
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assistance, and that also happens to be scared of what could happen. This, although has worked 
for the DPRK until now, may seem to change with the new desire for Japan to use nuclear 
technology as a mechanism of defense, which is precisely the third point, but a whole section 
will be dedicated to this topic at section number 9.  
8. WHY HAS THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY FAILED IN EXPLAINING 
JAPAN? 
 
The end of the Cold war is historically also presented as the start of a new democratic 
wave. In this sense, many hypothesis and theories started to be developed, with the purpose of 
explaining the new way states, as democracies, interact to each other within the international 
system. Nevertheless, Japan is an example of early democratization, as a consequence of its 
defeat by the United States and the Allies, already after the Second World War. Accordingly, 
Japan resulted from this war as a totally despondent nation, which had no more option but to 
surrender under the United States intention of shaping Japan’s national system. Therefore, the 
United States created a democracy very similar to the one that characterizes their national 
system, trusting that in this context Japan would be definitely taken out from the list of potential 
enemies and threats. For this reason, the action taken by the United States can be seen as an 
attempt to prove that democratic peace could be not only real, but applicable even after really 
extreme cases such as the Second World War, and the role Japan played within it. According to 
Michael W. Doyle, democracies do not fight other democracies and although:  
“No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does 
appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between 
liberal states. Indeed, threats of war also have been regarded as illegitimate”.62  
And in this sense, after becoming a very liberal democracy, it could be assumed that 
Japan had –and still has- nothing to fear about, at least in relation to those countries that were the 
protagonists to cause their vanquish, which were also democracies. This paper has not as its main 
purpose to explain what democratic peace theory is composed of, but it rather looks for 
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explaining why it is not, at least in the case of Japan, enough to assure why this country, even 
when nowadays it is still one of the most peace-loving nations in the globe, things may be getting 
really close to a change; always starting from a neorealist perspective.  
  Democratic peace theory has been broadly accepted and taken by scholars in order to 
explain the dynamics of international politics in relation to war and peace. In spite of having so 
much in favor, the democratic peace theory cannot be used as a general and irrefutable 
explanation to countries’ behavior, taking into account that calling a state a democracy could be 
extremely broad. Doyle, for example, suggests a co-relation between liberalism and democracy; 
in other words, those democracies he sustains would not be likely to go to war should have a the 
following liberties and rights guaranteed: 
“Liberalism calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called "negative freedom," 
which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the 
law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary 
seizure […] Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and 
rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and 
participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic participation 
or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two.”63 
 However, democracy is one of the concepts that is most out to interpretation; and 
defining it is not included as the core of this section, but rather pointing out that because 
democracy is not something that can be specifically described, the democratic peace theory loses 
its value as something that can effectively describe the nature of states behavior towards war and 
peace.   
It is also important to consider that not only states which political system counts with all the 
elements above described -that could be recognized as part of a democratic way of government- 
can be considered democracies. On the other side, is it possible to call a democracy a country 
which has a government form based on some of them? What about countries that have just one 
of these characteristics?  Let’s take Pakistan as an example. It is a matter of fact that this state 
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has gone through government forms that contradict the principles of democracy and that belong 
to a dictatorial nature; however, it is also true that in the past decades Pakistan has constituted 
itself as a federal republic, including within their national political elements characteristics of 
democracies. For this reason, Pakistani people are entitled to the right of universal suffrage, for 
all those citizens that are 18 years old and older, with the purpose of electing their president.
64
 
Additionally, the Prime Minister is elected by the National Assembly –political practice that 
characterizes democracies all over the globe -, and there are reserved parliamentary seats for 
women and non-Muslim population; which can be labeled as a representative practice. If 
applying a definition of democracy –where it is only having suffrage guaranteed, regularly 
realized and free of manipulation- and considering that democracy means literally the 
government of the people, then Pakistan could be seen as a democracy; possibly not the strongest 
established, but still a democratic government elected by the people. Of course, there will be 
theories that provide a broader description of what democracy is, or should be, for which 
Pakistan would not qualify; though, the former situation is presented as a valid argument to 
sustain that one of the weaknesses of the democratic peace theory is that the definition of the 
term democracy is a subject of interpretation. Continuing with the example, assuming that 
democracies, of whatever kind they are, are not willing, or at least less likely, to go to war with 
other democracies, the conflict within India and Pakistan deserves being mentioned. As Musarat 
Amin and Rizwan Nasser suggest at their paper Democratic Peace Theory: An Explanation of 
Peace and conflict Between Pakistan and India, the tensions these two countries have diminished 
as a consequence of Pakistan’s slow turn to democracy; for supporting this argument, both 
authors use the absence of war like those that happened throughout the history of these 
neighboring states. In fact, both authors suggest that when Pakistan has been under a non-
democratic government, tension between it and India has been stronger; nonetheless, this 
hypothesis is too general and, obviously, ignoring some major aspects of the relation between 
both countries. There is always the possibility for any of these two countries to start a war 
against the other, if one of their main interests would be involved; even India has proven to be 
close to start another conflict – in spite of being considered a pretty consolidated democracy, 
according to the authors’ definition-. Therefore, it is important to mention that, the real reason 
why they have not let a conflict break out is because a balance of power has been reached 
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especially as a cause of both countries possessing nuclear weapons; which neorealist authors 
have repeatedly proved to be accurate to what has been happening at the international arena since 
the nuclear era started. States’ generalized conduct suggests that whenever they feel threatened, 
they arm themselves. Also in this case, India and Pakistan serve as examples of countries having 
really big military expenditure, due to its conflict situation. Additionally, states in similar 
situation form strong alliances –in this case it is not even necessary to go deep into how India 
and Pakistan have looked for involvement of Russia, China, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and more as allies- just as a way to secure their destiny if a conflict actually breaks out. 
And this is very similar to what has been happening to Japan. Despite it is a democratic and 
peace-loving nation, and although the vast majority, if not all, of the states in the world perceive 
it as so, it is not free of being target of conflict.  As Waltz states:  “Conformity of countries to a 
prescribed political form may eliminate some of the causes of war; it cannot eliminate all of 
them”. The democratic peace thesis will hold only if all off the causes of war lie inside of states.” 
65
 Japan may not be the country to start it; however, that is due to internal security policies. In 
relation to the aforementioned, as Waltz states, it is also not accurate to say that democracies that 
perceive one another to be liberal will not fight because liberal democracies have at times 
prepared for war against other liberal democracies and have sometimes come close to fighting 
them.
66
 According to neorealist theory, it is easier to understand why a war could start than to 
understand the conditions of peace. In words of Emmanuel Kant, the natural state is the state of 
war. States tend to always look first for the compliance of their own interests; in this sense, war 
definitely presents itself as a way of materializing states own interests. It is true that states 
nowadays do no start wars as they used to, talking about an inter-state nature of conflicts. 
Nevertheless, there are still many latent conflicts about disputed territories, resources or 
sovereignty violations that could escalate to a multinational conflict. It is important to point out 
that whenever we talk about an anarchic world system, we are not referring to a system where 
countries can do whatever they want and, in this context, attack countries whenever they want. 
They truly can, if they do not is not because they put cooperation before their own interest, but 
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because they have fear of what attacking a country may imply for their own security, and of 
course, because the cost of war sometimes doesn’t make them get whatever they want.   
 Finally, this analysis of how democratic theory fails to explain the dynamic of the 
international system will takes us to better understand Japan’s foreign policy towards its allies 
and potential threats; and by so doing, it will come clear why Japan is pursuing a stronger 
management of arms, as well as the extension of their defense capabilities. Therefore, it is 
important to understand that states are always ready to do anything that will assure their survival 
within the international system, independently of what how democratic, liberal or peace-loving 
are. As Waltz puts it: “And today if a war that a few have feared were fought by the United 
States and Japan, many Americans would say that Japan was not a democracy after all, but 
merely a one-party state.”67 
9. JAPAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITION 
 
In general terms, States, as well as people, learn from the past. In this sense, Japan happens to be 
one of the states that falls into this description. However, in many senses Japan also represents an 
exception, especially, in terms of security. The Japanese comprehensive and alternative approach 
to security will be analyzed later on this paper; however, the relation between nuclear weapons, 
stability and security will be developed now. After Japan was nuclear bombed by the United 
States, it did not have many more options but to surrender. In this situation, we cannot really talk 
about balance of power, for Japan did not count on the nuclear arsenal to counterattack the 
United States. Nevertheless, after many decades and after other countries have nuclear arsenals 
the topic of balancing power becomes relevant. First, it is important to understand that Japan 
forever renounced its right to military attack any other country; which means, it s impossible for 
Japan to start a war, and, in the same way, it becomes very difficult for it to be attacked by any 
other state. However, although right after the Second World War ended the only interest of the 
Japanese government was to keep the country from not being attacked again, Japan has proven to 
be looking for its independence in terms of security.  
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 Seeing how Japan reemerged, especially in economic terms, after it was defeated made it 
obvious that it has the capability to develop nuclear material, just as many other big economies 
that are willing to do so, or have already done so. For a long time, it has being producing nuclear 
energy, and besides the incident in Fukushima, the world could believe that Japan’s use of 
nuclear material was peaceful. But even this started to change when, in June 2012, “The upper 
house of Japan’s Diet passed an amendment to the country’s Atomic Energy Basic Law to allow 
the use of nuclear power for ‘national security’.”68 Internal controversy developed around the use 
of those words, proving they were used furtively, for the Japanese public, as well as many Lower 
House lawmakers had no knowledge about it.
69
 There is no doubt that it is just a matter of Japan 
deciding to do so, in order for it to acquire nuclear power; taking into account that:   
“Japan has 30 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 1,200-1,400 kilograms of enriched 
uranium, enough to make 15,000 nuclear bombs like the one dropped on Hiroshima in 
1945. Tokyo also has state-of-the-art rocket technology for their long-distance delivery 
and spy satellites. In short, Japan has the world’s third-largest nuclear power generation 
capacity and is also the third-biggest military spender.”70 
 The question then should be directed to why Japan is feeling the necessity to count on 
nuclear power for exercising its defense in case of possible threats. In this regard, three different 
scenarios will be examined: First, a possible weakening of the protection provided by the United 
States –together with a natural desire of Japan to look for independence in this area-, second, an 
increasing rivalry in relation to China, and third, a possible escalation of a conflict in the Korean 
Peninsula- based on the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons-. For so doing, a deeper 
analysis of the relation between Japan and these countries will be made, always staying within 
the framework of Neorealism and its most important concepts. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS  
 
For concluding this work, it is necessary to make some comments that help giving closure and 
value to the hypothesis. First of all, it is important to mention that those concepts that constitute 
the Neorealist theory that have been taken as theoretical framework throughout this work have 
proven Neorealism to be a completely verifiable theory once again. The axes of analysis taken –
The United States, the People’s Republic of China, and both South and North Korea- have 
served as the main pieces of a system within which Japan has the necessity of including a 
military component in their foreign policy even when it has formally renounced to the right to go 
to war.  
Although relations between American and Japanese remain extremely close and non negotiable, 
Japan cannot trust that the U.S will completely take care of its security, and will eliminate the 
existence of any threat to Japan’s integrity. In this regard, American foreign policy has 
sometimes even turned to interests that are not shared by the Japanese, following the principle 
that states always want to guarantee their best interests. Insecurities have also been raised by the 
fact that the United States conducts a pretty independent policy towards China, state towards 
which Japan has not been able to have a definitive policy, and that has, at the same time, turned 
to those who destabilize the region the most – like North Korea-. Furthermore, Japan and China 
have had a long story of different ideological paths, at which Japan presents itself as a more 
Western country than anything else, for what cooperation between both has been rather limited o 
necessity. Territorial disputes are not an issue of the past between both countries, for what Japan 
has to keep an eye on China when reformulating its security strategies. Finally, North Korea 
presents itself as a state whose actions can directly affect Japan. Its nuclear capacity has, at the 
same time, created the restlessness that has lead the Japanese to consider expanding its defense 
arsenal towards the same direction. 
As it was exposed before, the possibility of even acquiring nuclear weapons for defense is on the 
table of Japanese politics, which nowadays constitutes the most undeniable proof that Japan’s 
role at the international arena has experimented a shift towards a more Neorealist attitude. With a 
new government in charge, expectative should be placed on Japanese Foreign Policy, as this 
state, slowly but undeniably, shifts towards rearmament moved by a strong sense of fear. 
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